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Abstract
Telecommuting policies have been increasingly adopted by employers.
The benets of telecommuting from the employers perspective include
direct cost-saving from not having to house employees in an o¢ ce and in-
direct cost-saving through reduced turnover associated with increased em-
ployee satisfaction. The downside is the perceived opportunity for shirk-
ing outside of the traditional workplace, a problem which is potentially
exacerbated if employees are placed into telecommuting teams. Using a
controlled experiment which randomly assigned subjects to participate in
the laboratory (non-telecommuters) or to participate online in a location
of their choice (telecommuters), we directly test whether telecommuters
are more likely to free ride when in teams and whether or not the locational
composition of the team inuences this outcome. We nd no evidence of
free-riding in teams for either telecommuters or non-telecommuters. We
also nd that variation in output when a worker is paired in a tradi-
tional team versus a telecommuting team can be attributed to the beliefs
subjects have about their teammates productivity. The last result leads
directly to policy implications for managers.
JEL Codes: J21 J24 J28 C90
Key Words: Telecommuting, Team Production, Productivity, Virtual
Teams, Economic Experiments
1 Introduction
Many workers have or will have the opportunity to work in a location other
than the traditional o¢ ce. Matthews and Williams (2005) estimated that ap-
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proximately 53 million people could potentially take advantage of the benets
from telecommuting, or 40% of the work force for the United States in 2005.
Though the potential number of workers who could telecommute is substantial,
the 2008 National Study of Employers found that only 3% of employers of-
fered paid work at home for the majority of employees. In 2004, this translated
to approximately 13.7 million salaried employees working from home at least
once a week.1 The discrepancy between the potential and observed numbers of
telecommuters poses a puzzle given the many known benets stemming from
such policies. Telecommuting policies represent an opportunity for employers
to directly lower costs through reduced overhead expenditures associated with
housing employees in a traditional o¢ ce (Piskurich, 1996). They also provide
an opportunity to increase employee satisfaction which attracts a higher quality,
more diverse workforce, and leads to cost savings by reducing turnover.
Yet despite these benets, a large number of employers are hesitant to adopt
telecommuting policies for all employees because of strong beliefs that telecom-
muting will lead to shirking outside of the o¢ ce - a problem which is potentially
exacerbated by the widespread use of teams in the workplace. The National
Study of Employers included open-ended questions for why workplace exibility
was implemented and the primary reason given by employers is overall retention
of employees (37%), with a small group of respondents (4%) citing increased
productivity.2 The primary factors associated negatively with implementing
workplace exibility were costs (30%) followed by expectations of productivity
loss (11%). What is notable is the contrast in opinions on productivity. Some
employers believe that workplace exibility will decrease productivity, while
others feel it will increase productivity.
In light of the above, it is perhaps not surprising that our current under-
standing of how the telecommuting environment a¤ects worker productivity is
not well understood (Bailey and Kurland, 2002, Menezes and Kelliher, 2011).
Two recent studies by Dutcher (2012) and Bloom et al. (2012) help shed light
on individual productivity di¤erences for telecommuters, but to our knowledge
there exists no direct empirical evidence for the impact of telecommuting policies
on team productivity. Arguably, the examination of telecommuting policies on
team productivity should be of utmost importance given the prevalence of team
usage in the workplace (Milliken and Martins, 1996) and the well-known incen-
tives for shirking under team production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holm-
ström, 1982). Part of the gap in our understanding is likely due to the di¢ culties
involved in gathering accurate measures of productivity in a eld setting where
team output is not cleanly separable into individual parts. To circumvent these
problems, we utilize an experimental design which allows us to carefully control
the variables of interest and isolate, in a causal manner, what may be driving
behavior in this complex setting.
The primary purpose of this paper is to determine if worker productivity
falls within a team environment when individuals are allowed to telecommute
1As estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2 In addition to telecommuting, workplace exibility includes care giving leaves and depen-
dent care initiatives.
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and to determine to what extent any changes in a workers productivity within
a team is inuenced by the number of teammates who are telecommuting. To
accomplish these goals, we randomly assigned subjects to participate in a team
production experiment in either a traditional structured o¢ ce-type location
(the experimental laboratory) or in an unstructured location of their choice.
Production involved a paid real-e¤ort typing task where to receive payment
subjects had to correctly decode a string of 6 letters into a set of 6 numbers.
Regardless of their location, all subjects participated initially on their own
where they were paid a piece-rate based on how many typing tasks were correctly
completed in a period of 8 minutes. Following the individual stage, participants
were then informed that they would be randomly matched with two other par-
ticipants to participate in a series of team stages that mimicked the individual
stage in all aspects except that payment was now based on average team output
rather than their individual output. Thus, the marginal payment in the team
stages was 1/3 of the marginal payment in the individual stage. Each subject
participated in three team rounds that varied the locational composition of the
members.
To examine a workers response to the locational composition of team, we
elicited beliefs for both the individual and team rounds. By eliciting these
beliefs for all types of participants we obtain an overall picture of worker be-
liefs on telecommuting productivity which allows us to control for di¤erences in
team production arising not because of location, but because of beliefs over the
relative productivity of partners.
We nd that productivity does not decrease when subjects are in a team
versus when they are not. We also nd a pronounced increase in productivity
when subjects have fewer telecommuters in their team. Underlying this result,
there exists a strong relationship between a subjects e¤ort and their beliefs
about the output of their teammates which suggests that subjects are behaving
as conditional cooperators. Surprisingly, telecommuters are not a¤ected by the
presence of other telecommuters or non-telecommuters on their team.
Our ndings have direct consequences for managers choosing to implement
telecommuting policies. First, managers should continue to play an active role
in selecting and maintaining a telecommuting team since individual character-
istics such as gender matter. Our results also indicate that managers need not
worry as much about the productivity of their telecommuters but should pay
more attention to the productivity of their o¢ ce-based workers. Finally, to en-
courage high productivity, managers should engage in activities which update
and maintain a workers perception (beliefs) that all members of the team are
contributing high e¤ort.
2 Related Literature
While conclusive empirical evidence on the productivity consequences of telecom-
muting is slim, a number of inroads on the broad topic of telecommuting have
been made in the business literature. Bailey and Kurland (2002) provide a
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summary of this literature and point out the many benets associated with
rms implementing telecommuting policies. These advantages suggest a hap-
pier, more satised workforce, higher protability for companies, and positive
spillovers to society.
Positive spillovers of telecommuting policies for society include reduced air
pollution, reduced energy consumption and reduced tra¢ c congestion (Piskurich,
1996 and Cascio, 2000).3 Moreover, benets to employees include decreased
transportation costs, increased control over their work environments, and in-
creased exibility; all of which allows the worker to work when they are the most
productive (Niles, 1975; Mokhtarian, 1991). Piskurich also states other benets
directly realized by the company. The most notable is saving as much as $8,000
per worker annually in o¢ ce space. Additionally, rms can expect increased
employee retention and increased productivity if they allow their workforce to
telecommute.
Though these are important elements to consider, we will focus on one of the
more controversial claims, which is that employees who telecommute are more
productive (Bailyn, 1988; Belanger, 1999; Hill et al., 1998). The almost univer-
sal nding that telecommuters are more productive is often scrutinized because
of the methodology employed to make this claim. The typical study uses a
survey method which asks the telecommuters directly if they are more produc-
tive in their telecommuting environment or in the o¢ ce environment. In most
instances, the telecommuters chose to be in this environment and would like
to continue to do so and so they may unintentionally or intentionally bias their
responses. Even when looking at a non-survey study (DuBrin, 1991), comparing
the productivity of the workers a manager allowed to telecommute with those
whom she did not does not give a clear indication of the environmental factors.
This is due to the fact that those workers who are allowed to telecommute have
likely built up the trust of a manager through their work ethic.
To overcome these di¢ culties, there are two studies which use random as-
signment of people to a location in order to isolate the environmental factors
on individual productivity. The rst is Dutcher (2012) who designed an ex-
periment around creative and dull tasks which randomly assigned subjects to
the laboratory or a location of their choice to perform the tasks in an e¤ort to
understand how telecommuting a¤ects individual productivity. The main nd-
ing of this paper is that productivity of the subjects performing the experiment
outside of the laboratory (telecommuting) decreased for the dull task, but ac-
tually increased for the creative task. This environmental inuence was found
to be strongest for males as females were not as a¤ected by their environment.
The second by Bloom et al. (2012) took advantage of a company seeking to im-
plement a telecommuting environment in China to perform a randomized eld
experiment. The authors nd that the performance of those working from home
exceeds that of those working in the o¢ ce. While useful for the measurement
of individual productivity under telecommuting policies, neither addresses work
3Cascio (2000) suggests that if 20,000 federal employees work from home at least one day a
week, they would save over 2 million commuting miles, 102,000 gallons of gasoline and 81,600
pounds of carbon dioxide emissions per week.
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performed in teams.
In addition to the literature on telecommuting, our paper also contributes
to the experimental literature on team production. In the examination of the
incentives for free-riding under a team revenue-sharing scheme our study re-
lates to the study by Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), who found high levels
of free-riding in an abstract e¤ort choice setting. Frequently, team production
is modeled through the use of public goods games (Dickinson and Isaac, 1998;
Croson, 2000). Closest in spirit to our set-up is the examination of individual
and team productivity using a real e¤ort public good framework by van Dijk et
al. (2001). The task utilized was a di¢ cult two-variable optimization problem.
They nd no signicant di¤erences in e¤ort levels between the individual and
team stages, a result which occurs because while some free-riding is observed
in teams in other instances individuals increased their e¤ort between individual
stage and team stage.
Our task design is most similar to Kuhn and Villeval (2011) who examine
gender selection into team-based payment or individual payment. Similar to
our design, Kuhn and Villeval also use a decoding task with broader outside
options such as internet search and reading magazines. One of their team-based
payment treatments involved equal revenue sharing between partners (teams
of two). Their primary result is that women select into team-based payment
schemes more often than men, except in situations where an e¢ ciency advantage
is added to the team payment, however, it is a secondary result that is of more
relevance to our paper. In line with our results, they nd no evidence of free-
riding when individuals move from individual based payment schemes to revenue
sharing teams. Furthermore, they nd evidence of an increase in productivity
as subjects move from the individual stage to the team.
3 Design of Experiments
The goal of the experimental design is to measure changes in productivity within
a team setting with varying numbers of telecommuters. To accomplish this we
had two types of subjects. The rst type, non-telecommuters, were individuals
recruited to participate in the laboratory at a pre-specied time. The second
type, telecommuters, were individuals recruited to participate online at a place
of their choosing anytime within a 24 hour block of time.4 To avoid self-selection
issues, the assignment of location was random and subjects in both locations
were recruited in exactly the same manner.5
Each subject, regardless of type, participated in a series of four 8-minute
rounds that gave them the option to spend their time on a paid typing task,
unpaid games of tic-tac-toe, or some combination of both tasks. The typing
4We did place one restriction on the telecommuting subjects. We asked that they partici-
pate in any location except the SOWI computer laboratory where the laboratory experiment
was taking place to ensure true location di¤erences.
5The show-up, or participation rate was similar for subjects recruited to both locations
thus ensuring that the assignment to location was truly random.
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task required subjects to decode a series of 6 random letters into a series of
6 numbers using a code that changed with each combination of letters.6 All
subjects received the same random sequence of letters and code in each round.
Across all four rounds the typing task was always paid while tic-tac-toe was
never paid. Prior to the set of paid rounds, all subjects participated in an
unpaid and virtually unlimited practice period of the typing task and tic-tac-
toe.7 Neither of the tasks required practice for mastery, but including this round
familiarized subjects with the interface used during the paid rounds.8
The rst paid 8-minute round was always played as an individual, regardless
of location. The individual round paid 8 euro-cents for each correctly coded
set of 6 letters and serves as our baseline measure of individual productivity.
Following the individual stage, all subjects then entered into a series of three
team rounds which varied the telecommuting composition of the team. In each
team round, subjects were randomly placed into teams of three so the location
composition varied between 0, 1, 2, and 3 telecommuters. In order to isolate
the environmental e¤ects, our teams were purposefully minimalistic with no
interaction or feedback, and were teams only in the sense that team output was
the determinant of pay rather than individual output.9 Subjectsanonymity was
preserved through the use of a random number for identication and payment.
The team stage itself was identical to the individual stage in that each subject
had the option of using the entire 8 minutes on the paid typing task or unpaid
tic-tac-toe, or some combination of both. However, in the team rounds the
payment for the typing task was now equal to 8 euro-cents multiplied by the
average correct output of the team so that e¤ort exerted in the paid task was
exerted for the team. In other words, we implemented a team pay scheme that
involved equal revenue sharing between the partners. Note that this reduced
marginal payment for each correctly coded word by 2/3.
Prior to each team round, we primed the subjects with their location and
the location of their partners, which changed in each round. To guarantee that
subjects were fully aware of the location of their teammates, we also included
prominent location information at the top of the screen where the subjects
performed the tasks. Our primary treatments are dened by the number of
telecommuters in a team.
Team Treatments:
1. Zero Telecommuter Team (LLL) - in the zero telecommuter team
treatment, each randomly matched team of three had only participants in
the laboratory (zero telecommuters).
6We used a revolving code to minimize learning e¤ects.
7Note that tic-tac-toe was included in order to ensure that our result is not overestimated.
This task gives subjects, especially those in the lab, an outside option and thus their e¤ort in
the task is not simply due to boredom from the task.
8The program had 100 random codes for the subject to practice with before the codes
would repeat and unlimited games of tic-tac-toe. On average, subjects correctly coded 14
words in the coding task and played 5 games of tic-tac-toe in the practice round.
9Subjects were told that no one in their team would ever observe any of their decisions or
outcomes.
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Order Lab
(# of Sub jects)
Telecommuter
(# of Sub jects)
1 LLL, LTT, LLT
(17)
TTT, LLT, LTT
(18)
2 LLL, LLT, LTT
(19)
TTT, LTT, LLT
(16)
3 LTT, LLT, LLL
(18)
LLT, LTT, TTT
(17)
4 LLT, LTT, LLL
(16)
LTT, LLT, TTT
(14)
Table 1: Treatment order and number of subjects in each session
2. One Telecommuter Team (LLT) - in the one telecommuter team
treatment, the team consisted of two participants in the laboratory and
one telecommuter, playing in a location of their choice.
3. Two Telecommuter Team (LTT)- in the two telecommuter team
treatment, the team consisted of one participant in the laboratory and
two telecommuters playing in a location of their choice.
4. Three Telecommuter Team (TTT) - in the three telecommuter team
treatment, each randomly matched team of three had only telecommuting
participants, playing in a location of their choice (zero participants from
the lab).
Recognizing that this type of task may result in fatigue or learning over
subsequent rounds, leading to the possibility of order e¤ects, we ran four or-
ders of the above treatments for each location type of subject. This resulted
in 8 total sessions summarized in table 1. We use Lab (L) to denote non-
telecommuters who participated in the laboratory and Telecommuter (T) to
denote subjects participating in a location of their choice. We ensured that
subjects were matched in a round with others primed with the same group com-
position. For example, subjects participating in LTT for the rst team round
in the laboratory were matched with telecommuting subjects also participating
in LLT for the rst round.10
At the end of the four rounds, we elicited beliefs regarding the performance
of their co-participants. Six questions were asked regarding co-participant out-
comes for the individual round and the three team rounds. Each question was
incentivized according to Palfrey and Wang (2009) using the payo¤ equation:
question earnings = 100  (Actual Outcome   Guess)2
10For the two telecommuter team treatment, the instructions for the lab participants speci-
ed that they would be placed into a team with two individuals participating in a location of
their choice, while the instructions for the telecommuting subjects stated that they would be
paired with one partner in the laboratory and one partner also participating in a location of
their choice. Priming for the other treatments was conducted in a similar fashion, taking into
account di¤erences in a subjects perception of the location of partners based on their own
location.
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All answers were paid in euro-cents with a correct answer resulting in pay-
ment of 1 Euro. The use of the quadratic rule implied that incorrect answers
were also paid, but as the distance between the respondents answer and the
correct answer increased, earnings decreased rapidly, providing strong incentives
to answer with accurate beliefs. Incorrect answers that would lead to negative
earnings were capped at zero.
For individual round beliefs, subjects were asked to guess the average per-
formance of those who participated in the lab and the average performance
of telecommuters. In teams, subjects were asked to guess the performance of
their teammates. When their teammates were both from the same location
(for example, as in the LLL), the subjects were asked to guess the average of
both teammates, while if their teammates were in di¤erent locations (for exam-
ple, as in LLT), subjects were asked to guess the absolute performance of each
teammate.
After beliefs, we also elicited risk preferences using a mechanism adapted
from Eckel and Grossman (2008). Subjects were o¤ered a choice between ve
binary 50/50 gambles where both expected value and risk are increasing in the
order of gambles. Choosing a lower gamble corresponds to higher risk aversion.
The experiment ended with subjects lling out a survey which asked about their
demographic characteristics, simple questions over workplace preferences, and
the location they participated in for the experiment.
The experimental design was programmed using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We ensured that
the recruitment procedure did not reveal that some of the subjects would be
asked to participate online. After the initial recruitment, subjects that would
participate in the laboratory were instructed of the time and place to participate
via e-mail. Telecommuting subjects were sent an e-mail that directed them to a
website with a link that contained an installer for the client-side of Z-tree (zleaf)
which would connect to the university server for these subjects to participate
online. The telecommuting subjects were instructed to participate in a location
of the choice and informed that they had 24 hours to complete the experiment.
The nature of the experiment required that payment was delayed for all
subjects. This has the added benet that the payment for subjects in both
locations is held constant. Each subject received an e-mail within 3 days of
their participation that their payment was ready and that they should bring
their unique subject ID with them to collect payment. The average subject
payment was e13.87 which does not include a show-up fee.
4 Hypotheses
Our rst hypothesis is derived from the simple realization that the marginal
payment for a correctly coded word decreases by 2/3 when an individual joins
a team. This reduction in pay should lead to a reduction in e¤ort, or at a
minimum, no increase for a money-maximizing agent.
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Hypothesis 1: The productivity of a subject in a team will not be higher when
compared to an individual baseline.
The stronger form of this hypothesis would state that productivity should
decline, but because we do not know the true value of the outside option for
this real-e¤ort task, we will maintain the safer assumption of no increase in
productivity.
The second hypothesis will examine what happens between our treatments
in the team setting. Specically, we want to examine if and how productivity
changes as a result of the location of a subjects teammates. Several studies
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Dickinson and Isaac, 1998) point out that work
done in teams has many of the features of a public good, and evidence also
exists that in the public goods setting many subjects are conditional cooperators
(Keser and Van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001) which implies that
subjects in a team will only work harder if they think others are also working
hard.
Hypothesis 2: Subjectsproductivity while in a team will positively correlate
with their beliefs about their team membersproductivity.
Hypothesis 2 requires two things. First, it requires us to know what sub-
jectsbeliefs are about their teammates, which we gather after the last round.
Second, it requires us to examine if these beliefs inuence behavior. Specically,
we will examine how subjectsbeliefs vary with the location of their teammates
and how this inuences their own behavior. In our setting, this suggests that if
subjects have varying beliefs on the productivity of their team members based
on location, their contributions while in a team will reect these beliefs. The
most obvious implication of this hypothesis is if subjects think that telecom-
muters are less productive. If an individual, regardless of location, believes that
telecommuters are less productive, then hypothesis 2 predicts lower resulting
e¤ort as the number of telecommuters on a team increases.
5 Results
We begin our results with an overview of the data. Figure 1 summarizes the
average correct output in the coding task by period. Period 1 was always the
individual round while periods 2 to 4 were team rounds where the treatment
order was varied. For each location, we ran four di¤erent orders summarized
previously in Table 1. The clear observation from gure 1 is that for both
subjects in the laboratory and telecommuters, output increased between the
individual round and team rounds. The increase in output from the individual
stage to the team stage is surprising given that the marginal wage earned for each
correctly coded sequence of letters decreased by 2/3 and according to Hypothesis
1, the implementation of a revenue sharing pay scheme between team members
is predicted to result in no productivity increase. Nevertheless, we observe
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Figure 1: Average output in each period across orders
10
Figure 2: Boxplot of output by gender
signicant increases in productivity for the coding task between the individual
baseline and team rounds. This result mirrors what was found by Kuhn and
Villeval (2011) under a similar set-up using a decoding task when individuals
moved from an individual piece rate to revenue sharing two-person teams.11
Figure 1 also suggests that the data possess a slight time trend which needs
to be controlled for, but no obvious order e¤ects appear.12
Regularity 1: Average productivity increased for both telecommuters and non-
telecommuters when subjects move from the individual stage to team stages.
Figure 2 is a boxplot diagram which allows a cleaner understanding of vari-
ance based on the treatment and gender. The box shows the interquartile range
11T-tests of the individual output to the output of any of the team treatments for either
location type show signicant di¤erences. While we are intrigued by the productivity increase
from individual to team output, the reason for this increase is beyond the scope of the current
paper.
12Kruskal-Wallis tests by location type across orders indicate signicant di¤erences between
orders, however this result is driven by ability and gender e¤ects rather than order e¤ects.
The Appendix contains a more detailed discussion of these results.
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(25-75) with the median highlighted, while the whisker extends from the box
to the most extreme data value within 1.5 times the interquartile range. The
remaining points represent outliers beyond that range. We see in Figure 2 that
medians across the team treatments do not vary greatly, but it is immediately
evident that for males who telecommute there is a large variation in output
suggesting strong gender e¤ects.
To determine the overall e¤ect of telecommuting teams, we must carefully
control for individual e¤ects and time trends. To di¤erentiate the impact of the
treatments on behavior from individual characteristics, we present a series of
random e¤ects panel regressions on output of correctly coded letter sequences,
seen in Table 2.13
The outcome variable is correctly coded sequences while the main explana-
tory variables of interest are how many telecommuters are in a team. The vari-
ables Zero, One, Two, and Three Telecommuters implies teams where there
are zero, one, two and three telecommuters in the team, respectively, while
the individual treatment serves as the baseline. These treatment variables are
then interacted with the location dummy, Home, to account for di¤erences in
the e¤ect of subjects participating in the lab versus telecommuters.14 Notice
that there are only two such interactions, One Telecommuter  Home and
Two Telecommuters  Home, because teams of zero telecommuters only ex-
ist for the subjects in the laboratory and teams of three telecommuters exist
only for telecommuting subjects. Thus, these six variables test if the increase
(or decrease) in output from the individual treatment to the respective team
treatments is statistically di¤erent than zero after controlling for other factors.
We also include a control variable for gender, represented by Female. The
variable Tic   Tac   Toe denes the number of games played in each round
while the variable Risk Measure is our use of the gamble chosen in the Eckel-
Grossman mechanism as a measure of risk attitude where lower numbers corre-
spond to higher risk aversion. Finally, Log Period represents the logged period
of play, and an interaction of Log PeriodHome accounts for potential di¤er-
ences in learning by location. Log Period is used to account for the decrease in
learning over time, a characteristic which is typical in these types of tasks and
is seen in Figure 1.
In the interest of space, we have suppressed control variables for individual
productivity and orders to focus on the variables of interest. Specically, all
regressions in Table 2 include decile rank dummy variables, an interaction of
the decile rank with Home, and dummy controls for the specic order a subject
participated in to account for potential order e¤ects.15
13All regressions include 135 subjects, participating over 4 rounds, giving 540 total obser-
vations. The numbers reported in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the individual
level to control for potential dependence of error terms. Three (***), two (**), and one (*)
stars indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Regressions exclude
the practice round.
14Our use of the term home to denote telecommuting subjects breaks with our previous
convention. However, this is done in a e¤ort to reduce confusion on treatments named by the
number of telecommuters interacted with the location of the subject.
15Full regressions are available from the authors upon request. All order e¤ects are insignif-
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Output Model 1
Pooled
Model 2
Female Only
Model 3
Male Only
Constant 15:667
(0:884)
14:736
(0:598)
15:730
(1:718)
Home (telecommuter)  4:004
(1:528)
 0:177
(1:419)
 6:918
(2:415)
Zero Telecommuter Team 2:228
(0:541)
1:446
(0:570)
3:047
(0:870)
One Telecommuter Team 1:598
(0:560)
0:900
(0:616)
2:407
(0:911)
One Telecommuter Team  Home  1:074
(1:096)
 0:825
(1:447)
 1:650
(1:642)
Two Telecommuter Team 1:664
(0:423)
1:282
(0:694)
2:214
(0:585)
Two Telecommuter Team  Home  0:424
(0:850)
 0:155
(1:131)
 1:267
(1:426)
Three Telecommuter Team 1:167
(0:704)
1:488
(0:857)
0:242
(1:335)
Female  0:090
(0:426)
Tic-Tac-Toe  0:414
(0:035)
 0:371
(0:069)
 0:382
(0:046)
Risk Measure (1-5)  0:162
(0:148)
 0:170
(0:103)
 0:165
(0:306)
Log Period 1:858
(0:754)
3:119
(0:622)
0:692
(1:232)
Log PeriodHome 1:967
(1:237)
1:408
(1:369)
2:727
(2:168)
# of Observations 540 296 244
# of Clusters 135 74 61
R  squared 0:817 0:854 0:835
Table 2: Random e¤ects panel regressions on correctly coded output, robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level.
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Model 1 demonstrates that when lab subjects move from the individual
baseline to any of the team stages there is a signicant increase in productivity.
This e¤ect is strongly signicant for Zero, One and Two Telecommuter Teams.
The largest impact on behavior appears to be when there are no telecommuters
in the team, though this e¤ect can only be conrmed when comparing the
coe¢ cients of teams of zero versus one telecommuter (Wald test, p < 0:01),
giving a statistical indication that the number of telecommuters in a subjects
team matters.
The story is quite di¤erent for the telecommuters. Looking rst at the three
telecommuter team case, it is shown that the increase in productivity from the
individual stage to teams made up of three telecommuters is not signicant at
the 5% level. For the telecommuters, it is also conrmed that the there is no
increase in productivity when there is one telecommuter on a team (p = 0:581)
or two telecommuters on a team (p = 0:099). Thus, the results show that the
non-telecommuters are a¤ected by the team treatment much more than the
telecommuters.
Turning to gender e¤ects, gure 2 provided evidence that males had a much
larger variance in productivity than females when allowed to telecommute. In
order to more cleanly account for these gender di¤erences, Model 1 was rerun
using only Females (Model 2) and only Males (Model 3).
From Model 2, we can see that the only strongly signicant e¤ect for females
is the increase in output for subjects in the lab going from the individual stage
to teams made of entirely other lab subjects (zero telecommuter team treat-
ment). No other increases in productivity can be conrmed for lab subjects or
telecommuters at acceptable levels. Turning to males, in Model 3 we immedi-
ately see a stronger team e¤ect for males in the lab who increase their output
when going from the individual rounds to team rounds. Telecommuting males
do not increase their productivity regardless of the team composition, mirroring
what was previously observed for telecommuting females in Model 2 (p > 0:05
for the total e¤ect in both instances).
Result 1: Subjects increased their productivity when going from the indi-
vidual treatment to the team treatments. This e¤ect is largely driven by non-
telecommuting males, and is strongest for teams composed of the fewest telecom-
muters.
Having established that the number of telecommuters in a team and the
location of the subject impacts the contributions of current teammates, we will
now address the underlying reason for these di¤erences, namely subjectsbeliefs
about their teammates. Our starting point for this analysis begins with hypoth-
esis 2, which states that a subject may contribute more e¤ort to a team if they
think their teammates are also contributing more, and will contribute less if they
think their teammates are contributing less. To obtain a precise understanding
icant at conventional levels, and all decile ranks and interactions of decile rank with location
are signicant at the 1% level.
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Figure 3: Relative frequency of beliefs regarding telecommuting productivity.
of beliefs, we examine the di¤erences in beliefs when subjects were asked to
predict output of telecommuters and lab subjects within the same treatment.
Our design facilitates this analysis as all subjects, regardless of whether or not
they were lab-based or a telecommuter, participated in one treatment where
they were paired in a team with one lab subject and one telecommuter.
Figure 3 breaks down this data by examining the frequency of subjects who
thought those based in the lab were more productive than, as productive as,
or less productive than telecommuters. It is evident that many more subjects
believed that lab subjects were more productive than believed they were less
productive or equally productive. A McNemars test conrms that the number
of subjects who thought those in the lab were more productive is greater than
those who thought there was no di¤erence (p < 0:01) or who thought telecom-
muters were more productive (p < 0:01) The same result can also be found when
looking at beliefs over productivity in the individual treatment where subjects
were also asked to compare the productivity of subjects in each location. In the
individual treatment, 47% believed those in the lab were more productive, while
26% thought there was no di¤erence and 27% believed telecommuters were more
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of average beliefs over partner productivity (x-axis) versus
output (y-axis)
productive.
Regularity 2: Both telecommuters and non-telecommuters believed that telecom-
muting would have a detrimental e¤ect on productivity.
To begin the examination of how these beliefs correlate with e¤ort decisions
in the treatments, testing hypothesis 2, gure 4 provides a scatterplot of output
in relation to beliefs about teammatesoutput for each treatment. Included in
each of the belief graphs is a dashed line representing the simple regression and
how this correlation relates to a 45 degree line. From this gure, it is easy to see
the positive correlation between output and beliefs, though some heterogeneity
is obviously present.
To go beyond the simple correlations, Figure 5 illustrates how beliefs inu-
ence relative increases (or decreases) in output when subjects hold di¤ering be-
liefs about their teammatesproductivity when paired with two telecommuters
versus when they were paired with two lab subjects. Comparing when an indi-
vidual was paired with two telecommuters versus when they were paired with
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Figure 5: Correlation of beliefs with an increase in productivity when subjects
are paired with telecommuting teammates versus when they are paired with
lab-based subjects.
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Di¤erence in Output Model 4 Model 5
Female Only
Model 6
Male Only
Constant  3:345
(3:377)
 1:264
(5:317)
 4:843
(4:359)
Beliefs of Lab Teammates  0:472
(0:179)
 0:051
(0:266)
 0:915
(0:2422)
Beliefs of Lab TeammatesHome 0:285
(0:232)
 0:204
(0:323)
0:781
(0:335)
Beliefs of Home Teammates 0:521
(0:122)
0:067
(0:172)
1:062
(0:178)
Beliefs of Home TeammatesHome  0:007
(0:185)
0:753
(0:281)
 0:590
(0:270)
Female 0:226
(0:627)
Home (telecommuter)  3:471
(4:375)
 11:160
(7:249)
 3:265
(2:582)
Di¤erence in Tic-Tac-Toe  0:340
(0:139)
 0:244
(0:182)
 0:236
(0:220)
Risk Measure (1-5)  0:011
(0:209)
 0:061
(0:263)
0:216
(0:328)
# of Observations 135 74 61
R  squared 0:267 0:145 0:459
Table 3: Regressions on the di¤erence in correctly coded output when a subject
was paired with two other subjects who were at home versus when they were
paired with two other subjects who were in the lab.
two lab-based subjects provides the best contrast for how subjects will behave
in the two extreme situations. The vertical axis represents the di¤erence in
a subjects output when paired with two telecommuting subjects versus when
they are paired with two lab subjects. Values above zero indicate that the sub-
ject produced more when paired with two telecommuters than when paired with
two lab workers while values below zero imply the opposite. The graph shows
that subjects who believe that telecommuters are better than their lab coun-
terparts increase their output when paired with two telecommuters over what
they produced when they were paired with two lab subjects. The reverse is true
when subjects think that telecommuters are not better. If a subject held beliefs
that telecommuters were not more productive than those in the lab, output was
below their productivity when they were paired with teammates from the lab.
Notice that these results hold regardless of the location of the subject.
We again turn to regression analysis, seen in Table 3, for a more formal
understanding of beliefs.16 The dependent variable in the regressions presented
is the di¤erence in output when a subject was paired with two home subjects
versus when they are paired with two lab subjects, following what was previ-
ously shown in Figure 5. The model is similar to the one used in Table 2 except
now the main explanatory variables are the beliefs a subject holds about the
productivity of their lab teammates, their telecommuting teammates and these
16As in the previous regressions, Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
18
two variables interacted with Home to account for locational di¤erences. Look-
ing at these beliefs separately will inform us if the e¤ect is stronger for beliefs
about telecommuters or lab-based subjects. Notice that since the dependent
variable is the output of a subject when paired with two telecommuters minus
output when paired with two lab-based teammates, according to Figure 4 there
should be a negative correlation on the beliefs of other lab subjects and a posi-
tive correlation on the beliefs of telecommuters. In other words, the di¤erence
in output should become more negative as beliefs of the lab subjects becomes
more positive since there is a positive relationship between beliefs and e¤ort.
Similarly for the beliefs of the telecommuters. As before, we will run regressions
on the full sample (Model 4), then break the sample into only females (model
5) and only males (model 6).
Focusing rst on the subjects in the lab, Model 4 conrms that there is a
strong correlation between e¤ort and beliefs about a subjects teammates re-
gardless of their location. This can be seen in the signicant negative e¤ect
on the coe¢ cient Beliefs of Lab Teammates and the signicant positive e¤ect
seen on the coe¢ cient Beliefs of Home Teammates. For telecommuters, the
same negative e¤ect of beliefs about a subjects lab teammates cannot be con-
rmed (p = 0:196) while the positive e¤ect of beliefs about other telecommuting
teammatesproductivity is conrmed (p < 0:01).
Returning once again to gender di¤erences, Model 5 shows that females,
regardless of location, are not inuenced by their beliefs of the output of their
teammates in the lab (for telecommuting females, p = 0:161) but telecommuting
females are inuenced by their beliefs of their teammates who are also telecom-
muting (p < 0:01) while the same cannot be said for the beliefs of females in
the lab.
For males in the lab, Model 6 conrms the negative e¤ect of beliefs about
their teammates in the lab and the positive e¤ect of their beliefs about their
telecommuting teammates. For telecommuting males, Model 6 does not conrm
that a subjects beliefs about their teammates in the lab inuenced their relative
e¤ort choices (p = 0:556), but it does conrm the positive, but smaller, e¤ect of
a subjects beliefs of their teammates who were also telecommuting (p = 0:027).
Result 2: Subjectse¤ort choices are positively related to their beliefs about
their teammatesoutput. This result is strongest for non-telecommuting males
and both male and female telecommuters beliefs about other telecommuters.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to address a very fundamental question on the minds
of many managers: How does telecommuting inuence output of teams? An-
swering this question is vital since managers still have reservations about al-
lowing their employees to work outside the o¢ ce even though the evidence is
mounting in favor of doing so. The apprehension is understandable, however.
The additional free-riding incentives present in teams compounds the fears that
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the telecommuting environment fosters shirking behavior (Mokhtarian and Sa-
lomon, 1997). In order to provide more relevant policy recommendations, we
also set out to answer, not just if, but why productivity may vary when someone
moves from being matched in a traditional team to a telecommuting team.
We used a novel experimental design which randomly assigned subjects to
participate in either the laboratory or online in a location of their choice. They
were asked to perform a real-e¤ort task individually or in teams with varying
numbers of telecommuters. Surprisingly, when comparing the output in the
individual rounds to the team rounds, we found no evidence of free-riding in
teams. At the individual level, we nd that as in Dutcher (2012), the main
e¤ects come from males. The output of male telecommuters is more variable
and there is a (slight) increase in output of the lab subjects when they are paired
with fewer telecommuters. Our teams were minimalistic in form as we allowed
no communication, no joint decision making, and all three members retained
complete anonymity. The use of random matching of anonymous partners and
no feedback likely helped support no free-riding, a conjecture forwarded by
Andreoni (1988) who found that stranger matching led to higher contributions
and less free-riding in a public goods framework.
Nevertheless, the non-decrease in productivity moving from the individual
stage to the team stages is surprising, especially given the boring nature of the
task and 2/3 marginal payo¤ decline moving from a piece-rate pay scheme to
revenue sharing. This result extends the previous experimental results found
in Kuhn and Villeval (2011) who used a similar task and provides laboratory
robustness for the eld evidence of more productive teams observed in Hamilton,
Nickerson, and Owan (2003).
Examining why this e¤ect exists, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that in-
creases in team productivity can be due to increased peer-pressure. Despite
the fact that subjects would never observe the e¤orts of their partners and vice
versa, their e¤ort directly impacted the payo¤s of others in their team. If they
felt internal pressure (guilt), they would be more reluctant to free-ride in teams.
This e¤ect is amplied if the subjects believed everyone else in their team would
choose a high e¤ort level.
This leads naturally to the idea that subjects in our setting were responding
as if they were conditional cooperators (Keser and Van Winden, 2000; Fis-
chbacher et al. 2001). In our setting, conditional cooperators would be dened
as individuals who contribute more e¤ort to the paid task if they believe their
teammates also contributed more e¤ort to the paid task.
Evidence of the above two conjectures is supported by our ndings that
di¤erences in output when a subject is paired with two lab-based workers versus
when they are paired with two telecommuters is strongly tied to their beliefs
about their teammates productivity. Specically, we nd a positive correlation
between a subjects chosen e¤ort and their beliefs about the e¤ort of their
teammates which provides an explanation as to why a subject may be less
productive when they are in a telecommuting team.
This paper has three main implications for managers considering implemen-
tation of a telecommuting policy. The rst is that the main nding should help
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alleviate managersfears that employees will shirk more outside of a managers
direct supervision when the work to be performed is in teams. The second point,
more subtle in nature, is that managers should continue to play an active role
in selecting who they allow to telecommute given the substantial role played by
individual heterogeneity in productivity. The third, and most important im-
plication of our ndings is that even if there is a negative consequence due to
some team members telecommuting, reinforcement that all team members are
contributing a high e¤ort level will keep productivity high since e¤ort choice is
positively correlated to beliefs about their teammatesproductivity.
7 References
1. Andreoni, J. (1988) Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public
Goods Experiments,Journal of Public Economics, 37, pp. 291-304.
2. Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972) Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization,American Economic Review, 62, pp. 777-795.
3. Bailey, D. and Kurland, N. (2002) A Review of the Telework Research:
Findings, New Directions and Lessons for the Study of Modern Work,
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23, pp. 283-400.
4. Bailyn, L. (1988) Freeing Work from the Constraints of Location and
TimeNew Technology, Work, and Employment, 3, pp. 143-165.
5. Belanger, F. (1999) WorkersPropensity to Telecommute: An Empirical
Study,Information & Management, 35 (3), pp. 139-153.
6. Bloom, N., Liang, J., Roberts, J., and Ying, Z.J. (2012) Does Work-
ing from Home Work? Evidence from a Chinese Experiment. Stanford
working papers.
7. Bond, James, Ellen Galinsky, and Kelly Sakai (2008) 2008 National Study
of Employers, New York, NY: Families and Work Institute. Retrieved
from http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/2008nse.pdf.
8. Cascio, W. (2000) Managing a Virtual Workplace, The Academy of
Management Executive, 14 (3), pp. 81-90.
9. Croson, R. (2000) Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms: an
experiment in team production,Research in Experimental Economics, 8,
pp. 8597.
10. Dickinson, D.L. and Isaac, R.M. (1998) Absolute and Relative Rewards
for Individuals in Team Production,Managerial and Decision Economics,
19, pp. 299-310.
21
11. DuBrin, A. (1991) Comparison of the Job Satisfaction and Productivity
of Telecommuters Versus In-House Employees: A Research Note on Work
in Progress,Psychological Reports, 68, pp. 1223-1234.
12. Dutcher, E.G. (2012) The e¤ects of telecommuting on productivity: An
experimental examination. The role of dull and creative tasks,Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
13. Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (2008) Forecasting Risk Attitudes: An Ex-
perimental Study Using Actual and Forecast Gamble Choices, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68 (1), pp. 1-17.
14. Fischbacher, U. (2007) Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox For Readymade Economic
Experiments,Experimental Economics 10 (2), pp. 171-178.
15. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E. (2001) "Are people conditionally co-
operative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters,
71 (3), pp. 397-404.
16. Greiner, B. (2004) The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A
Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics, - University
of Cologne, Working Paper Series in Economics 10.
17. Hamilton, B. H., Nickerson, J. and Owan, H. (2003) Team Incentives and
Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on
Productivity and Participation. Journal of Political Economy, 111 (3),
pp. 465-97.
18. Hill, J., Miller, B., Weiner, S., and Colihan, J. (1998) Inuences of the
Virtual O¢ ce on Aspects of Work and Work/Life Balance, Personnel
Psychology, 51, pp. 667-683.
19. Holmström, B. (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 13, pp. 324-340.
20. Kandel, E. and Lazear, E. (1992) Peer Pressure and PartnershipsJour-
nal of Political Economy, 100, pp. 801-17.
21. Keser, C. and Van Winden, F. (2000) "Conditional Cooperation and Vol-
untary Contributions to Public Goods," The Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 102 (1), pp. 23-39.
22. Kuhn, P. and Villeval, M.C. (2011) Do Women Prefer a Co-operative
Work Environment?,- IZA Discussion Paper No. 5999.
23. Matthews, H.S. and Williams, E. (2005) Telework Adoption and Energy
Use in Building and Transport Sectors in the United States and Japan,
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 11 (1), pp. 21-30.
22
24. Menezes, M. and Kelliher, C. (2011) Flexible Working and Performance:
A systematic Review of the Evidence for a Business Case, International
Journal of Management Reviews, 13, pp. 452-474.
25. Milliken, F. J. and Martins, L. L. (1996) Searching for common threads:
Understanding the multiple e¤ects of diversity in organizational teams,
Academy of Management Review, 21, pp. 402-33.
26. Mokhtarian, P. (1991) Telecommuting and Travel: State of the Practice,
State of the Art,Transportation,18, pp. 319-342.
27. Mokhtarian, P. and Salomon, I. (1997) "Modeling the Desire to Telecom-
mute: The Importance of Attitudinal Factors in Behavioral Models,"
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 31 (1), pp. 35-50.
28. Nilles, J. (1975) Telecommunications and Organizational Decentraliza-
tion,IEEE Transactions On Communications, 23 (10), pp. 1142-1147.
29. Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. (1997) Productivity Under Group
Incentives: An Experimental Study,American Economic Review, 87 (3),
pp. 314-341.
30. Palfrey, T. and Wang, S. (2009) "On eliciting beliefs in strategic games,"
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71(2) pp. 98-109.
31. Piskurich, G. (1996) Making Telecommuting Work,Training and De-
velopment, 50, pp. 20-27.
32. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005) Economic News Release: Work At
Home Summary- Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/news.release/homey.nr0.htm.
33. van Dijk F., Sonnemans J., and van Winden, F. (2001) Incentive systems
in a real e¤ort experiment.European Economic Review, 45, pp. 187-214.
8 Appendix
8.1 Examination of order e¤ects and treatment averages
Our objective in running the selected four treatment orders for each location
type was to test the strongest cases for order e¤ects. For the lab subjects, the
orders were dened by having the zero telecommuter treatment (LLL) placed
at the front and back-end of the team rounds. Correspondingly, the orders for
the telecommuters alternated the three telecommuter treatment (TTT) between
the front and back-end of the team rounds. For individuals participating in the
lab, Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate no signicant di¤erences between orders for
output (zero telecommuter team, LLL, p = 0:250; one telecommuter team, LLT,
p = 0:646; two telecommuter team, LTT, p = 0:583). For individuals partici-
pating as telecommuters, there are no signicant e¤ects between orders for the
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Coding Task Individual 0 Telecommuter 1 Telecommuter 2 Telecommuter 3 Telecommuter
Team Team Team Team
Lab
(n=70)
22:35
(5:90)
26:58
(6:14)
26:18
(5:33)
26:20
(6:69)
 
Telecommuter
(n=65)
23:73
(6:84)
  27:09
(7:89)
27:8
(7:13)
27:66
(7:56)
p  value 0:210 0:432 0:181
Table 4: Average output of coding task, by location type. Standard deviation
in parentheses. Reported p-values represent results from two-sided t-tests for
di¤erences in means.
three telecommuter team treatment, TTT (p = 0:550). However, signicant dif-
ferences are found for the two telecommuter team, LTT, and one telecommuter
team, LLT (p = 0:048 and p = 0:014, respectively).
Breaking down the two telecommuter team treatment by gender for the
telecommuters, we eliminate the signicant di¤erences between orders (females
in the two telecommuter team treatment, p = 0:109; males in the two telecom-
muter team treatment, p = 0:279). Likewise for the one telecommuter team
treatment, between orders there are no signicant di¤erences for females out-
side of the lab (p = 0:121), yet signicant di¤erences remain for males outside of
the lab, but these can be attributed to ability e¤ects as removing the top 10% of
performers in overall productivity results in insignicant di¤erences (p = 0:380).
We have also run these same tests using the parametric version of the Kruskal-
Wallis test (ANOVA) and nd the same results.
Table 4 provides averages, by treatment and location type. Note that these
overall means are largely misleading given the individual e¤ects and the time
trends observed, but we include these here for the interested reader. Again,
the previously observed increase from the individual stage to any of the team
stages remains. In terms of raw average output, a t-test picks up no statistical
di¤erence between the average output of lab subjects and telecommuters when
they both have the same number of telecommuters in their team. The di¤erence
in output when there are three telecommuter teams versus when there are zero
telecommuter teams is also found to be insignicant (p = 0:37). While these
averages support no productivity loss due to the number of telecommuters on
a team, they must be interpreted carefully as a signicant amount of variation
in the data exists due to gender and ability. Moreover, these averages do not
address the idiosyncratic response to the number of telecommuters in a team.
8.2 Screenshots
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Individual Round
25
Team Round
8.3 Experimental Instructions
Introduction:
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. These instructions ex-
plain the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer
interface you will be using.
These instructions are complex, please make sure you read through them
carefully. The instructions and stages of the experiment are self-paced, so when
you have nished and a "Continue" button is available, please press it.
General Description:
This is an experiment on the economics of decision making where you will
have the chance to earn money based on the decisions made by you and others.
You should be able to complete the entire experiment on your own without any
external assistance of any kind.
You will have the opportunity to make money during todays experiment,
which consists of four, 8-minute rounds. Because of the nature of the experi-
ment, your payment cannot be immediately calculated. More detailed instruc-
tions for how you can pick up your cash payment for participation today will
be given at the end of the experiment.
All payments are condential; no other participant will be told the amount
you make.
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Tasks:
In each round, you will be able to choose between two tasks. You can split
your time among the tasks however you choose. Meaning you can spend all of
your time on task I and none on task II, all of your time on task II and none on
task I, or some combination of task I and task II, or neither.
Please press "Continue" to see an example of the tasks you will be presented
with in each round.
Task 1:
For task I, a string of 6 random letters is displayed below a code bar. The
code bar will link a series of letters with a corresponding number. Your task
is to nd the corresponding number associated with the letters and type it in
the space provided. Once you are satised with your answer, you will hit the
"check answer" button to submit your answer. For each correctly coded string,
you will receive e0.08.
The example below shows you the layout of the game. After you submit a
code correctly, the code bar will change and a new set of random letters will
appear
In this example, the correct code would be 10 17 12 11 22 17. You would
get credit for this answer by typing each number in the box below each letter
which corresponds to this number in the code bar. However, because this is
an example, the "Check Answer" button is non-functioning. During the actual
experiment, you would submit your answer with the "Check Answer" button.
Please press Continue to see an example of the second task you will be
presented with in each round.
Task 2:
In task II, you will be playing a game against the computer. The game is
commonly known as tic-tac-toe. There are nine spaces in which to either put an
X or an O. The X represents your choice, while the O represents the computers
choice. You will win the game when you have three Xs in a row.
You will be able to track your wins and losses against the computer. You
will not be paid for playing tic-tac-toe.
Practice:
To familiarize yourself with the tasks and computer interface, you will be
taken to a practice round. You will not be paid for this round, it is only for
practice purposes. Please press continue to enter into the practice round.
When you have nished practicing the two tasks, you may continue whenever
you are ready by clicking Continue.
Below, you will see an example screen of the screen you would see during a
round. You will always have the ability to play both tasks in a round.
In the actual experiment, the left box will contain detailed information about
how you will be paid while the right box will contain the summary instructions
for both tasks.
Payo¤s:
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As explained previously, you will be presented with two tasks: the coding
task and tic-tac-toe. For each correctly coded string in the coding task, you will
receive e0.08. Incorrectly coded strings carry no penalty of payment. Tic-tac-
toe is unpaid. Lets go through an example of how payo¤s work.
Payment Example:
Assume in this round you correctly coded 35 strings of random characters in
the allotted time. Since you will get e0.08 for each correctly typed entry, you
would receive e2.80 for this round.
If on the other hand you correctly coded 30 strings of random characters in
the allotted time, you would receive e2.40 for this round.
Timing:
The time remaining in each round will be displayed in the upper right corner
of your screen. When the time limit of 8 minutes has expired, you will auto-
matically be taken to a new screen with instructions on how to proceed. When
you are ready, please click continue to enter into round 1.
New Instructions:
The tasks and time limit (8 minutes) in this round are the same as the
previous round. However, there is an important change. The di¤erence between
this round and the previous round you played is that instead of playing as an
individual, you will now be playing in a group of two others and your pay will
now depend on your choices and the choices of two others. The others in your
group will either perform the task in the SOWI Computer lab or in a location
of their choice. More on the locations in a moment.
You will be randomly and anonymously matched with the others in your
group. The other members of the group will be given the same two tasks that
you are, and as before, the coding task is the only task paid, however, the way
that the coding task is paid has changed.
New Payo¤s:
In this round, you and the other 2 members of your group will accumulate
group earnings equal to e0.08 for each correctly coded string your group solves,
together. These group earnings will then be equally divided between you and
the other two members of your group. In equation form, your payo¤ = [e0.08
* (your output + member 1s output +member 2s output)]/3
To understand how the team payment scheme di¤ers from the individual
payment scheme, please click "Continue" to see examples.
Group Payment Examples:
Suppose for example you solve 30 coding problems correctly (recall that
tic-tac-toe is still unpaid) and the other two group members each solved 20
. You and the other two members of your group would now receive [e0.08 *
(30+20+20)]/3 = e1.87, which is less than the payo¤ example previously given
for the individual payment scheme where you contributed 30.
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If, on the other hand, you solve 30 problems and the other two group mem-
bers each solved 40, you and the other two members of your group would now
receive [e0.08 * (30+40+40)]/3 = e2.94, which is more than the example of
the individual payment scheme where you contributed 30.
As another example, suppose that you correctly solved 28 and the other two
group members each solved 30. You and the other two members of your group
receive [e0.08 * (28+30+30)]/3 = e2.35, which is less than in the example for
the individual payment scheme where you contributed 30.
As a nal example, suppose that you and the other two group members each
solved 30 coding task problems correctly. You and the other two members of
your group receive [e0.08 * (30+30+30)]/3 = e2.40, which is the same as in
the example for the individual payment scheme where you contributed 30.
Group Member Information:
All choices are anonymous. The other members in your group will never
be told your specic output, nor will they be told the amount that you played
tic-tac-toe. Likewise, you will never be told the specic output of your group
members or how much they played tic-tac-toe.
The only information you will be given about the other members of your
group is where they will be participating. Similarly, the other members of your
group will only know that you are participating in "the SOWI computer lab
(a location of your choice"). The members of your group are not necessarily
participating today.
You are about to begin the next round, but before you begin, we will give
you information about the location of the members of your group.
Location of the members of your Group:
You are currently participating in the SOWI computer lab" ("a location of
your choice"). The other members of your group are also participating in the
SOWI computer lab." (a location of their choice, which is not the SOWI com-
puter lab (for example, they may be participating from home on their personal
computer).
When you are ready, please click continue to enter into the next round.
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